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Abstract
Most decision models for handling vague and imprecise information are unnecessarily
restrictive since they do not admit for discrimination between diﬀerent beliefs in diﬀerent
values. This is true for classical utility theory as well as for the various interval methods that
have prevailed. To allow for more reﬁned estimates, we suggest a framework designed for
evaluating decision situations considering beliefs in sets of epistemically possible utility and
probability functions, as well as relations between them. The various beliefs are expressed
using diﬀerent kinds of belief distributions. We show that the use of such distributions allows
for representation principles not requiring too hard data aggregation, but still admitting
eﬃcient evaluation of decision situations.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Background
A quite widespread opinion is that the principle of maximising the expected utility
captures the concept of rationality. However, the shortcomings of this principle, and
of utility theory in general are severe, and has to be compensated for [12,13]. One of
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the main problems with the principle is that it requires too hard aggregation of
background data. Nevertheless, there is a need for eﬃcient evaluation principles, but
there are obvious trade-oﬀs between eﬃciency and quality of information. A number
of models with representations allowing imprecise probability statements have been
suggested. Some of them are based on
• possibility theory [6,11];
• capacities (of order 2) [5,10,23,24];
• evidence theory and belief functions [9,34–36,39];
• various kinds of logic [32,43];
• upper and lower probabilities [8,13–15,22,25,26,30,37,40,42];
• sets of probability measures [18,28,29] or
• hierarchical models, such as second-order probability theory [16,20,21]
while others are based on more general theories, such as,
• fuzzy measures (capacities of order I) [1–4,7,27,33,38].
The common feature of the alternative approaches is that they do not include the
additivity axiom of probability theory and consequently do not require a decision
maker to model and evaluate a decision situation using precise probability (and, in
some cases, utility) estimates. 1
The interval representations above are restricted in the sense that no distributions
over the intervals are taken into account. Trying to solve this, various kinds of hi-
erachical techniques has evolved, where judgements of the probability estimates of
lower types are taken into account. 2 These approaches are mainly concerned with
probability estimates, and sometimes introduce various rules for aggregating the
information. A limiting factor from a decision analytical viewpoint is, however, that
they they do seldom allow for evaluation of utilities at all. Another severe limitation
is that the theories almost never discuss practical applicability, e.g., methods for
determining the consistency of user-asserted sentences. 3
Attempting to capture these kinds of features, we will herein describe how
impreciseness can be modeled and evaluated using belief distributions. The next
sections describe a representation model for impreciseness, and discuss some general
properties of belief distributions. It is also described how new belief distributions can
be derived from projections of belief distributions. Thereafter, we demonstrate how
decision situations modeled using belief distributions can be evaluated even if there
are dependencies between the variables under consideration. We will also explain in
what sense such distributions can deﬁne solution sets to a set of constraints.
1 A survey of theories of imprecise probabilities is provided in, e.g., [41].
2 A brief history of hierarchical models and various aspects on these are provided in, e.g., [19].
3 This criticism is elaborated upon in [16].
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2. Representation
The basic entities in the kinds of decision situations we will consider are ﬁnite set
of alternatives. Over these sets, diﬀerent functions can be deﬁned, such as probability
measures and utility functions.
Deﬁnition 1. Let H be a set of outcomes. An alternative Ci ¼ fcijgj¼1;...;mi , is a set of
events such that Cij \ cik ¼ ;, for all j 6¼ k, and [mij¼1cij ¼ H. A decision situation is a
set, D ¼ ffcijgj¼1;...;migi¼1;...;n, where each fcijgj¼1;...;mi is an alternative.
Over such decision situations, one option is to deﬁne probability and utility
functions in the classical way. Another more elaborated option would be to
deﬁne sets of candidates of possible probability and utility functions. For
instance, in [8] such an approach is suggested. The possible functions are expressed
as vectors in polytopes that are solution sets to, so called, probability and utility
bases.
For instance, that the probability (or utility) of cij lies between the numbers ak and
bk is expressed as pij 2 ½ak; bk
 ðuij 2 ½ak; bk
Þ in the probability (utility) base. Simi-
larly, that a measure of cij is greater than a measure of ckl is expressed as
pij P pklðuij P uklÞ.
Each statement can thus be represented by one or more constraints.
Deﬁnition 2. Given a decision situation D ¼ ffcijgj¼1;...;migi¼1;...;n. A utility base is a
conjunction of linear constraints of the types above, together with the equations
uij 2 ½0; 1
, for each consequence in D. A probability base has the same structure, but
also includes in
Pmi
j¼1 pij ¼ 1, for each alternative fcijgj¼1;...;mi in D.
Example 1. The solution vectors ðp11; p12; p13Þ satisfying the probability base
fp11 þ p12 þ p13 ¼ 1; p11 P 0; p116 0:6; p12 P 0:3; p126 0:5; p13 P 0:1; p136 0:5g can be
represented as the polytope shown in Fig. 1. Each vector in the polytope corresponds
to a probability distribution over the alternative fc11; c12; c13g. Thus, the polytope is a
subspace of the space of all possible probability distributions over fc11; c12; c13g with
respect to the probability base.
Since a vector in the polytopes can be considered as representing a distribution, a
probability base P can be interpreted as constraints deﬁning the set of all possible
probability measures over the consequences. Similarly, a utility base V consists of
constraints deﬁning the set of all possible utility functions over the consequences.
The bases P and V constitute the information frame.
Deﬁnition 3. Let D ¼ ffcijgj¼1;...;migi¼1;...;n, be a decision situation. An information
frame is the structure ðD;P;VÞ, where P is the probability base in the variables
ffpijgj¼1;...;migi¼1;...;n and V is the utility base in the variables ffvijgj¼1;...;migi¼1;...;n.
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2.1. Discrimination of beliefs
The probability and utility estimates can be expressed by probability distributions
and utility functions. To enable for a diﬀerentiation of functions, a distribution
expressing various beliefs can be deﬁned over a multi-dimensional space, where each
dimension corresponds to, for instance, possible probabilities or utilities of conse-
quences. By this, the distributions can be used to express strength of beliefs in dif-
ferent vectors in the polytopes. To get a basic intuition of such distributions,
consider the following examples.
Example 2. Assume that the probability of an event is between 0.3 and 0.5, and the
intensity of belief in the values are expressed by a piecewise linear function:
f ðxÞ ¼ maxð0;minð100x 30;100xþ 50ÞÞ:
Consequently, the graph consists of a triangle of altitude 10 and with the line seg-
ment between 0.3 and 0.5 on the x-axis as base. The area of this triangle is 1.
Utility statements can be represented in a similar way. Furthermore, relations
between parameters, such as linear combinations or comparisons, do naturally result
from qualitative estimates or from multivariate statistical analyses. To express
relations between the variables, we have to consider larger parts of the decision
space.
Fig. 1. The polytope is the region within the gray border.
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Example 3. Assume that the function
f ðx1; x2Þ ¼ 3 x
2
1 þ x22
 
if 1P x2 P x1 P 0
0 otherwise

represents beliefs in diﬀerent vectors ðx1; x2Þ. The volume under the graph of this
function is 1.
2.2. Belief distributions
The basic idea in the examples above is that a decision maker does not necessarily
have to believe with the same faith in all possible functions that the vectors represent.
To enable a diﬀerentiation of functions, distributions expressing various beliefs were
deﬁned.
Below, we will use the concept of a unit cube. A unit cube is the set ½0; 1
k, where k
is the number of probability, or utility, variables involved, for example, it may
consist of all possible solution vectors
ðp11; p12; . . . ; p1m1 ; . . . ; pn1; . . . ; pnmnÞ
to the probability base of an information frame, where the probability variables can
be assigned numbers between 0 and 1, satisfying
Pmi
j¼1 pij ¼ 1 for all i.
Deﬁnition 4. Let a unit cube B ¼ ðb1; . . . ; bkÞ be given. 4 By a belief distribution over
B, we mean a positive distribution g deﬁned on the unit cube B such thatZ
B
gðxÞdVBðxÞ ¼ 1
where VB is some k-dimensional Lebesque measure on B. The set of all belief dis-
tributions over B will be denoted by BDðBÞ.
Example 4. Consider a uniform belief distribution over a unit cube B ¼ ðb1; b2Þ. One
interpretation of this is that we have no information about the values.
Example 5. The functions f : b1 ! b1 and h : b2 ! b2 are belief distributions over
the one-dimensional unit cubes ðb1Þ and ðb2Þ, respectively, deﬁned by
f ðx1Þ ¼ maxð0;minð100x1 þ 20; 100x1ÞÞ
and
hðx2Þ ¼ max 0;min

 100
3
x2 þ 80
3
;
200
3
x2  100
3

:
4 The bis are written out to make the dimension clearer. More rigorously, the unit cube should be
represented by ½0; 1

Pn
i¼1 mi . For the same reason, we will sometimes denote a cube using variables pij and
uij.
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These have graphs given by triangles with bases on the x1-axis and the x2-axis,
respectively, and with areas¼ 1. Therefore, gðx1; x2Þ ¼ f ðx1Þ  hðx2Þ is a belief distri-
bution over a unit cube ðb1; b2Þ.
Belief distributions can also be used to represent subsets of a unit cube by con-
sidering the support of the distributions. 5
Deﬁnition 5. Let a unit cube B ¼ ðb1; . . . ; bkÞ and a distribution g over B be given.
The support of g (supp g) is the closure of the set fðx1; . . . ; xkÞ : gðx1; . . . ; xkÞ > 0g.
3. S-projections of distributions
The only information at hand in a decision situation may be local over a subset of
lower dimension, because most decision makers are not able to perceive their global
beliefs, and have no access to, or perception of, the belief distributions over the entire
information frame. An important aspect is therefore to investigate the relationship
between diﬀerent distributions. We need a semantics for this relationship, i.e., what
do beliefs over some subset of a unit cube mean with respect to beliefs over the entire
cube. One reasonable candidate for providing this semantics is provided by the
concept of S-projections.
In the next theorem and the following, we use x to denote the vector ðx1; . . . ; xkÞ
and x0 to denote the vector ðxi1 ; . . . ; xisÞ, ij 2 f1; . . . ; kg. The exact meaning will be
clear from the context.
Deﬁnition 6. Let B ¼ ðb1; . . . ; bkÞ and A ¼ ðbi1 ; . . . ; bisÞ, ij 2 f1; . . . ; kg, be unit cubes.
Furthermore, let F 2 BDðBÞ be given, and let
fAðx0Þ ¼
Z
BA
F ðxÞdVBAðxÞ:
We say that fA is an S-projection of F on A. This projection will be denoted ProjAðF Þ.
An S-projection of a belief distribution is also a belief distribution, as the fol-
lowing theorem states.
Theorem 1. Let a unit cube B ¼ ðb1; . . . ; bkÞ and F 2 BDðBÞ be given. Let also
fA ¼ ProjAðF Þ. Then
fAðx0Þ 2 BDðbi1 ; . . . ; bisÞ; ij 2 f1; . . . ; kg
5 When representing a subset of lower dimension than the unit cube itself, distributions that are upper
bounded cannot be used, since a mass under such a distribution will be 0 while integrating with respect to
some Lebesgue measure deﬁned on the unit cube. This particular problem is solved in detail in [16].
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Proof. All we need to prove the theorem is to show that
Z
A
fAðx0ÞdVAðxÞ ¼ 1:
According to the deﬁnition of the S-projection fA, we getZ
A
fAðx0ÞdVAðxÞ ¼
Z
A
Z
BA
F ðxÞdVBAðxÞdVAðxÞ ¼
Z
B
F ðxÞdVBðxÞ ¼ 1: 
A special case of this is when belief distributions over the axes of a unit cube B are
S-projections of a belief distribution over B. Let a unit cube B ¼ ðb1; . . . ; bkÞ and
F 2 BDðBÞ be given. Then
fiðxiÞ ¼
Z
Bi
F ðxÞdVBi ðxÞ
where Bi ¼ ðb1; . . . ; bi1; biþ1; . . . ; bkÞ, is a belief distribution over the axis bi.
4. Evaluation
The evaluation principle treated in this section is based on the principle of
maximising the expected utility. Given a decision situation D, let P and V be a
probability base and a utility base for D, respectively. The diﬀerence EðCiÞ  EðCjÞ
of expected utilities between two alternatives denotes the expressionPmi
s¼1 pisvis 
Pmj
s¼1 pjtvjt where pij and vij are variables in P and V. To evaluate this
diﬀerence considering P and V, Danielson and Ekenberg [8] suggests a variety of
principles. However, the approaches are limited since belief distributions are not
included in these suggestions, and we will demonstrate how such distributions can be
taken into account in the evaluations.
4.1. The generalized expected utility
We will now describe how belief functions can be imposed on evaluations of
decision situations and accounted for in the evaluations of the expected utility. We
deﬁne a decision scenario as containing two belief distributions. One over all
probability variables, and one over all utility variables. Informally, the belief dis-
tributions express the beliefs in vectors in the solution sets to the probability base
and the utility base, respectively.
First, the expected utility diﬀerence is deﬁned to take care of decision situations,
where there are dependencies between the variables of diﬀerent alternatives. Then we
show how this can be evaluated by the use of centroids.
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Deﬁnition 7. A decision scenario is a structure ðD; P ; V ; FP ; FV Þ, where
ii(i) D is a decision situation D ¼ ffcijgj¼1;...;migi¼1;...;n.
i(ii) P ¼ ðp11; p12; . . . ; p1m1 ; . . . ; pn1; . . . ; pnmnÞ is a, unit cube.
(iii) V ¼ ðv11; v12; . . . ; v1m1 ; . . . ; vn1; . . . ; vnmnÞ is a, unit cube.
(iv) FV is a belief distribution over V .
(v) FP is a belief distribution over P , such that Projp
i
ðFP ÞðxÞ ¼ 0, when
Pmi
j¼1 pij 6¼ 1,
where pi is the unit cube ðpi1; . . . ; pimi Þ. 6
Next, a generalized expected utility is suggested, where dependencies between
variables from diﬀerent alternatives are taken into account. All possible expected
utilities, weighted by the belief distribution over the solution sets of the probability
and utility bases, are summed up in an expected utility diﬀerence.
Deﬁnition 8. Let a decision scenario ðffcijgj¼1;...;migi¼1;...;n; P ; V ; FP ; FV Þ be given.
Furthermore, let
Pij ¼ ðpi1; . . . ; Pimi ; Pj1; . . . ; PjmjÞ
and
Vij ¼ ðui1; . . . ; uimi ; uj1; . . . ; ujmjÞ
be unit cubes. Let fPij ¼ ProjPi;jðFP Þ and fVij ¼ ProjVi;jðFV Þ. The expressionZ
PijVij
Xmi
s¼1
xisyis
 

Xmj
t¼1
xjtyjt
!
fPijðxÞfVijðyÞdVPijVij ðxÞ;
where
x ¼ ðxi1; . . . ; ximi ; xj1; . . . ; xjmjÞ
and
y ¼ ðyi1; . . . ; yimi ; yj1; . . . ; yjmjÞ
is called the expected utility diﬀerence between Ci and Cj, and is denoted by
GðCi;CjÞ.
This means that the generalised expected utility summarizes all contributions
from the various vectors multiplied by the belief in these vectors. Needless to say,
this is an arbitrary evaluation rule, and we suggest it without an axiomatic justiﬁ-
cation (that anyway would not be more persuasive than the rule itself), but still it
seems to be a very natural extension of the classical notion of expected utility. 7
6 A requirement of a belief distribution over the probability variables of an alternative is here that the
belief should be 0 in a vector where the mapping does not add up to one.
7 In [31], there is a thorough and suggestive discussion of the value of such axiomatizations.
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4.2. Centroids
Centroids will be important when evaluating the alternatives. Intuitively, the
centroid of a distribution is a point in space where some of the geometrical properties
of the distribution can be regarded as concentrated.
Deﬁnition 9. Let a unit cube B ¼ ðb1; . . . ; bkÞ and g 2 BDðBÞ be given. The centroid
of g is the point xg ¼ðb1; . . . ; bkÞ in B whose ith component is
bi ¼
Z
B
xi  gðxÞdVBðxÞ:
Centroids are invariant under projections on subsets of the unit cubes in the sense
that the S-projections of a centroid on a subset has the same coordinates as
the centroids of the corresponding S-projections. The theorem below implies that the
components of the centroid of an S-projection fA, of a belief distribution, F , are the
corresponding components in the centroid of F .
Theorem 2. Let B ¼ ðb1; . . . ; bkÞ and A ¼ ðbi1 ; . . . ; bisÞ; ij 2 f1; . . . ; kg be unit cubes.
Let fAðxi1 ; . . . ; xisÞ be an S-projection of a belief distribution F on A. Then if
xF ¼ ðb1; . . . ; bkÞ is the centroid of F
then
xfA ¼ ðbi1 ; . . . ; bisÞ is the centroid of fA:
Proof. By the deﬁnition of S-projections, fAðx0Þ ¼
R
BA F ðxÞdVBAðxÞ. Therefore
bi ¼
Z
A
xi  fAðx0ÞdVAðxÞ ¼
Z
A
xi
Z
BA
F ðxÞdVBAðxÞdVAðxÞ
¼
Z
B
xiF ðxÞdVBðxÞ 
The next theorem shows how the expected utility diﬀerence between Ci and Cj can
be calculated by using only the centroids of the belief distributions.
Theorem 3. Let a decision scenario ðffcijygj¼1;...;migi¼1;...;n; P ; V ; Fp; FV Þ be given. Let
Pi ¼ ðpi1; . . . ; pimiÞ
and
Vi ¼ ðVi1; . . . ; VimiÞ
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be unit cubes. Let fPi ¼ ProjPiðFP Þ and fVi ¼ ProjViðFV Þ. Then
GðCi;CjÞ ¼ hxfPi ; xfVi i  hxfPi ; xfVj i
where hx; yi is the standard inner product of x and y.
Proof. Let xfPi ¼ ðai1; . . . ; aimiÞ and let xfVi ¼ ðbi1; . . . ; bimiÞ. Since fPi 2 BDðPiÞ, and
fVi 2 BDðViÞZ
Pi
xit  fPiðxÞdVPiðxÞ ¼ ait
Analogously we getZ
Vi
yitfViðyÞdVViðxÞ ¼ bit
Thus, by the independence of Pi and Vi we getZ
PiVi
xit  fPiðxÞ  yit  fViðyÞdVPiViðxÞ ¼ ait  bit
Thus
GðCi;CjÞ ¼ ðai1  bi1 þ    þ aimi  bimiÞ  ðaj1  bj1 þ    þ ajmj  bjmjÞ
¼ hxfpi ; xfvi i  hxfpj ; xfvj i 
4.3. Local representation
As was mentioned above, the only information at hand in a decision situation
may be local over a subset of lower dimension. Furthermore, the complexity in
calculating the centroids is problematical. An important aspect is therefore to
investigate diﬀerent distributions over subsets of the unit cubes above. However, it is
not suﬃcient to investigate the dimensions one by one.
Example 6. In Example 3, we deﬁned a belief distribution that expressed that
x2 P x1. The function
f ðx1; x2Þ ¼ 3ðx
2
1 þ x22Þ if x2 P x1
0 otherwise

maps to zero when x1 > x2.
However, if we only have information of the beliefs along the x1 and x2 axes
separately, it is impossible to express this inequality.
Example 7. Moreover, the properties of local distributions are sometimes contra-
intuitive, considering the entire information frame. For instance, assume that
everything we know is that x2 P x1. If we are handling local representations along the
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axes only, it might be tempting to assert the uniform distributions f1ðx1Þ ¼ 1 and
f2ðx2Þ ¼ 1 representing this ignorance of relative beliefs. The centroids of these
functions are xf1 ¼ xf2 ¼ 0:5. Theorem 1 now implies that a belief distribution over
the unit cube ðx1; x2Þ must have the centroid (0.5,0.5). This centroid is on the line
x1 ¼ x2. At the same time there should be no belief in vectors where x2 < x1.
Therefore, there cannot be any contribution of mass from this area. Consequently,
the distribution is non-zero on the line x1 ¼ x2 only. See Fig. 2.
Consequently, there is often a need of investigating larger sub-sets of the entire
decision space. As the example above indicate, expressing ignorance with uniform
local distributions only, e.g., like in interval approaches, may sometimes be mis-
leading. As soon as either xi P xj or xj P xi is the case (which is not too seldom a
reasonably assumption), local approaches are insuﬃcient. A special case of this is
Fig. 2. The distribution must be on the line x1 ¼ x2 only.
Fig. 3. A global distribution with support on x2 P x1 only.
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that pure interval approaches sometimes seem to be inadequate when they are
interpreted as assuming that the points in the intervals are equally reasonably.
Therefore, the eﬀects of imposing various kinds of constraints must be taken into
account (Fig. 3).
Example 8. Again, assume that everything we know is x2 P x1. This ignorance can be
expressed by a uniform distribution
F ðx1; x2Þ ¼ 2 if x2 P x10 otherwise

The S-projection on x1 of this function is shown in Fig. 4.
More generally, the following theorem implies that it is not possible to discrim-
inate distributions in this respect. It states that a product of belief distributions over
each dimension always is a belief distribution over the entire space. The important
observation is that this belief distribution cannot represent relations between the
parameters, but still projects on the initial local distributions.
Theorem 4. Let a unit cube B ¼ ðb1; . . . ; bkÞ and F 2 BDðBÞ be given. Let
fi ¼ projbiðF Þ. Furthermore, let
Gðx1; . . . ; xkÞ ¼ f1ðx1Þ  . . .  fkðxkÞ:
Then fi ¼ projbiðGÞ, for all 1; . . . ; k.
Proof. This follows from the deﬁnition of derived distributions and the independence
of the variables, i.e.,
Fig. 4. An S-projection of F ðx1; x2Þ.
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Z
Bi
f1ðx1Þ  . . .  fkðxkÞdVBi ðxÞ ¼
Z
B
f1ðx1Þ  . . .  fkðxkÞx1 . . . dxi1dxiþ1 . . . dxk
¼ fiðxiÞ 
Z
b1
f1ðx1Þdx1
 
 . . .

Z
bi1
fb1ðxi1Þdxi1
 

Z
biþ1
fbþ1ðxiþ1Þdxiþ1
 !
 . . . 
Z
bk
fkðxkÞdxk
 
¼ fiðxiÞ  1  . . .  1 
Consequently, when we are using local information and when there are relations
between the parameters, these must be represented explicitly.
4.4. Linear constraints
It should be noted that one property of belief distributions is that they can deﬁne
relations between diﬀerent variables. Nevertheless, in many cases, it may be that the
only accessible knowledge is in terms of local beliefs and relations between these, i.e.,
no belief distribution is known for an entire information frame.
Such relations can often be expressed as linear constraints, e.g., aP xi, a6 xi,P
xi ¼ a, or xi6 xj þ a.
Consequently, the support of a belief function could be used to specify the
solution set of a set of linear constraints. One way of modeling the solution set of a
set of constraints is therefore to consider when a belief distribution is positive only
for vectors in the solution set.
Deﬁnition 10. Let a unit cube B ¼ ðb1; . . . ; bkÞ and a consistent set C of constraints in
B be given. The global belief distribution F is called C-congruent in B iﬀ
x is a solution vector to C iff x 2 supp F :
4.5. Relations between constraints and belief distributions
As has been argued above, belief distributions over subsets of a decision space B
are important, but they cannot be used to represent relations between variables.
Therefore, it is of particular interest to investigate in what sense a set of such dis-
tributions can represent essential properties of a belief distribution g over B, such
that g, even if it is unknown, models the belief distributions over the subsets as well
as the relations between them.
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A set of belief distributions and a set of constraints describing the decision
problem must be congruent in a certain respect. An important condition on the
distributions is that the vectors of centroids of the distributions are consistent with
the constraints.
Deﬁnition 11. Let B and A  B be unit cubes. Let C be a consistent set of constraints
in B. A distribution fA 2 BDðAÞ is called C-admissible in A iﬀ the centroid ðxfAÞ is in
the normal projection of the solution set of C on A.
The following theorem follows from Theorem 1 and the observation, from stan-
dard convexity theory, that the solution set of a set of linear constraints is convex.
Theorem 5. Let B and A  B be unit cubes. Let C be a consistent set of linear con-
straints in B. Let F be a C-congruent global distribution in B, and let fA ¼ projAðF Þ.
Then fA is a C-admissible belief distribution in A.
4.6. Potential decision scenarios
If the decision maker is able to deﬁne a suﬃciently rich set of belief distributions
and a set of constraints describing the decision problem, and if the distributions are
admissible w.r.t. these constraints, suﬃcient properties of belief distributions over
the entire solutions sets of P and V can be determined.
Given a set of constraints, a decision maker is therefore restricted concerning
which combinations of local belief distributions that can be imposed, if she wants to
be consistent in a reasonable sense. However, as have bees seen above, for the
purpose of evaluating a generalised expected value, a suﬃcient condition on the
distributions is that the vectors of centroids of the user-asserted local belief distri-
butions are consistent with the constraints.
Deﬁnition 12. A potential decision scenario is a structure
ðD; P ; V ; fP ; fV ;CP ;CV Þ;
where
ii(i) D is a decision situationffcijgj¼1;...;migi¼1;...;n.
i(ii) P ¼ ðp11; p12; . . . ; p1m1 ; . . . ; pn1; . . . ; pnmnÞ is a unit cube.
(iii) V ¼ ðv11; v12; . . . ; v1m1 ; . . . ; vn1; . . . ; vnmnÞ is a unit cube.
(iv) fP and fV are sets of belief distributions over subsets of P and V , respectively.
(v) CP is a set of constraints in the pij variables,
(vi) CV is a set of constraints in the vij variables.
Deﬁnition 13. Given a potential decision scenario ðD; P ; V ; fP ; fV ;CP ;CV Þ, we give
the following deﬁnitions.
ii(i) Let fP ¼ ffP1 ; . . . ; fPsg denote the set of belief distributions over the given sub-
sets of P .
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i(ii) Denote the unit cube that is the domain of fPj by ðbpj1 ; . . . ; bpjmj Þ. fP is called P -
exhaustive if
Sn
j¼1 ðfj1; . . . ; jmjgÞ ¼ f1; . . . ; kg.
(iii) Denote the centroid of fPj by xfPj ¼ ðapj1 ; . . . ; apjmj Þ. fP is called P -regular if
apis ¼ apjt whenever pis ¼ pjt .
(iv) Similarly for fV .
The following theorem follows now directly from Theorems 1 and 5.
Theorem 6. Given a potential decision scenario ðD; P ; V ; fP ; fV ;CP ;CV Þ. Furthermore,
let FP 2 BDðP Þ and FV 2 BDðV Þ. If
vii(i) for all j, fPj is P -exhaustive and P -regular.
vi(ii) xfpj ¼ ðapj1 ; . . . ; apjmj Þ.
v(iii) for all j, fVj is V -exhaustive and V -regular.
(iv) xfVj ¼ ðbvj1 ; . . . ; bvjmj Þ.
(v) Fp is CP -congruent.
(vi) FV is CV -congruent.
(vii) fPi ¼ projPiðfP Þ.
(viii) fVi ¼ projViðfV Þ.
Then
(a) fPi is CP -admissible.
(b) fVi is CV -admissible.
(c) GðCi;CjÞ ¼ ai1  bi1 þ    þ aimi  bimi  ðaj1  bj1 þ    þ ajmj  bjmjÞ.
This means that we can represent a decision scenario using arbitrary subspaces of
the entire space for evaluating the expected utility diﬀerence. The assumptions of the
two functions Fp and Fv are not necessary, but are emphasizing that there can be
belief distributions over the entire space, modeling the constraints, even if they are
not stated explicitly. The only interesting attribute of them for us is that the com-
ponents of the centroids, are the same as the components in the centroids of the
projections, that we actually use in the representation of the problem.
5. Concluding remarks
We have presented theoretical foundations of a theory for analyzing decision
situations including probability and utility estimates, when the available information
is indeterminate. The approach allows comparisons of alternatives as well as pro-
vides the possibility of expressing varying degrees of imprecision in the input sen-
tences. The main idea is that impreciseness is expressed by belief distributions,
expressing relative beliefs in diﬀerent values. The contribution in this article is the
provision of a theory that makes it possible to relate the consequences of diﬀerent
alternatives against each other, while taking such distributions into account. Since
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the principle of maximizing the expected utility is considered to be a central decision
rule, the evaluation model used herein generalizes this, and demonstrates how the
complexity of the evaluations can be considerable reduced.
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